The countervailing power of large buyers subdues the market power of sellers, but price concessions won by large buyers in upstream markets may or may not translate into lower prices downstream as Galbraith (1952 Galbraith ( , 1954 once contended. This paper presents a model that formalizes certain previously neglected elements of Galbraith's argument, and shows that upstream price concessions may lead to lower downstream prices. In this model, a large retail chain store with countervailing power plays one large supplier off against another to win lower prices. An indirect effect of these interactions is that small retailers also pay lower prices, although not as low as the chain. Finally, competition among the retailers drives retail prices lower. The retail-price-restraining effect of the chain is stronger than the effect that is produced by the entry of an additional supplier.
I. Introduction
The notion that the "countervailing power" of large buyers subdues the market power of sellers has a long history, beginning with Galbraith (1952 Galbraith ( , 1954 . 2 Galbraith's claim that large buyers utilize this power to win pricing concessions from suppliers that are not extended to small buyers is widely accepted. But his further claim that price concessions won by large buyers in upstream markets translate into lower retail prices was and remains controversial. Stigler (1954) in particular argued forcefully that Galbraith's predictions about the downstream transmission of discounts lacked a compelling theoretical foundation.
This paper revisits the question of whether and when consumers might be beneficiaries of the advantageous pricing that a dominant buyer obtains from its suppliers, and offers a formal reconstruction of Galbraith's argument. The goal is to recreate a theoretical framework that is closer to Galbraith's narrative than has appeared elsewhere, and to assess the plausibility of
Galbraith's claim -that countervailing power upstream translates into lower prices downstream -within that framework.
The model presented here incorporates two features of dominant buyers that Galbraith emphasized and that have not been incorporated previously in a theoretical examination of countervailing power. Previous work has been limited to downstream price effects when large buyers purchase from an upstream monopolist. But Galbraith wrote mainly about supplier oligopolies and "the opportunity of a strong buyer to play one seller off against the other" (1952, 2 A note on terminology: Countervailing power is market power on the demand side of a market in which sellers also have market power. This term is distinguished from monopsony power, which generally refers to market power on the demand side of a market in which the supply side is structurally competitive. Buyer power is a related term. Shaffer (2008, p. 1612 ) define buyer power as "the ability of buyers to obtain advantageous terms of trade from their suppliers." In principle, the suppliers of the buyer in question may or may not have market power themselves. Whether or not they do has significant implications for market outcomes (Chen, 2007 and Mills, 2010) .
5 that would prevail if the manufacturers played Cournot with total demand in each retail market.
Finally, retail competition insures that small retailers' savings are passed on to consumers through lower retail prices. The paper's main result is that, in these circumstances, the countervailing power of the chain becomes an instrument for reducing retail prices at the expense of upstream suppliers.
II. Countervailing Power and Downstream Prices
It is widely recognized that, as Galbraith observed, large buyers often obtain price concessions from their suppliers that are not available to small buyers. There are several explanations for this empirical regularity. The most obvious explanation is that sellers' costs may not increase in proportion with the quantities that different buyers purchase. Lower per-unit costs of serving large buyers may be due to scale economies in production, transacting, or logistics. This explanation applies to essentially any configuration of buyers and sellers, and does not involve the exercise of market power. Other explanations involve industry structures that allow the exercise of market power on one side of the market or the other.
A monopolist who cannot distinguish large buyers from small buyers in advance of a sale may use quantity discounts as a price discrimination tactic to induce profitable buyer separation (Oi, 1971) . Similarly, a monopolist with incomplete information about buyers' valuations of its good may charge lower prices for larger quantities because of risk aversion (DeGraba, 2005) .
Other explanations for quantity discounts use the Nash bargaining solution to characterize separate and simultaneous negotiations between a monopolist and independent buyers of various sizes where, plausibly, the firms' joint surplus is concave in the quantities purchased (Horn and Wolinsky, 1986; Stole and Zweibel, 1996; Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Inderst and Wey, 2003; Raskovich, 2003; and Chae and Heidhues, 2004) . In these models, large buyers negotiate larger discounts because their transactions create a greater incremental surplus per unit than do small buyers' transactions. Snyder (1998) provides an explanation for why large buyers win discounts in a market with oligopolistic sellers and buyers of various sizes. Terms of trade are determined independently for each buyer. The main idea is that large buyers pay lower prices because the degree of tacit collusion that sellers can sustain is less for large buyers than for small buyers. In effect, sellers compete more aggressively for sales from large buyers than small buyers.
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While it is generally agreed that large buyers pay lower prices, Galbraith's principal claim -that price concessions won by large buyers upstream translate into lower downstream prices -remains problematic. In answering his early critics, Galbraith had to concede that downstream competition plays a greater role in translating the effects of countervailing power downstream than he claimed at first. He acknowledged that in emphasizing "the social utility of countervailing power," he had neglected to emphasize that his claim requires competition in retail markets (1954, p. 3) . 6 Subsequent research on the downstream effects of countervailing power supports this concession.
For instance, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) 
and similarly for manufacturer 2. When solved simultaneously, the firm's first-order conditions for maximizing profits yield a Cournot-equilibrium output level 1 2 0  y y y . The equilibrium wholesale and retail prices in the representative market are:
The manufacturers' profits in that market are:
and retailers earn no profits. Assume that fixed costs and the number of markets are such that F/m is too large for a third manufacturer that anticipates Cournot interactions to enter the upstream market profitably. The incumbent manufacturers are not threatened by the prospect of a new manufacturing entrant.
IV. The Chain Store
Next, suppose that an entrepreneur uniquely endowed with the requisite organizational capacity emerges to establish a chain store that operates an outlet in each of the m geographic markets. Everything else remains the same as before. Because downstream entry is free, and because there are no retail scale economies, independent retailers remain in each retail market and those markets remain competitive. To keep the focus on countervailing power, assume that the chain's retail operations are neither more nor less efficient than those of the independent retailers.
From the manufacturers' perspective, the chain is distinguished from other retailers by its size. Even if the chain's outlet in each market is the same size as other retailers, the chain is m times larger than other retailers. This size asymmetry is even greater if, as this model suggests, the chain's outlets are larger than other downstream firms. In keeping with Galbraith's reasoning, if the chain is large enough in relation to the other retailers (i.e., if m is large), the chain is unlikely to exhibit the passive, price-taking behavior of atomistic buyers in a competitive market. Instead, the firm will exercise countervailing power against the suppliers to win advantageous terms of sale that are not available to small buyers.
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Consider both the source of the chain's countervailing power and the use to which it is put. First, the source. Although there are several explanations for why the seller might offer volume discounts to large buyers, Galbraith appears to have had a specific mechanism in mind.
He attributes the large buyer's countervailing power to a credible threat that the firm could reject 8 Galbraith's focus on the role of sprawling retail chains was prescient. Based on their analysis of the U.S. Bureau of the Census' Longitudinal Business Database, Jarmin, Klimek and Miranda (2005, p. 5) observe that "The ascendancy of chain stores is clearly one of the most important developments in the evolution of retail markets in the U.S. . . .". They find that between 1963 and 2000, the percentage of U.S. retail establishments that were operated by chains increased from 20 percent to 35 percent (Jarmin et al., 2005, p. 5) . The mean number of independent retail establishments per 1000 residents in U.S. counties fell by 31 percent between 1976 and 2000 while the corresponding number of chain stores increased by 37 percent (Jarmin et al., 2005, p. 20 This idea was developed rigorously by Katz (1987) and by Sheffman and Spiller (1992) , but Galbraith anticipated the argument when he observed that dominant buyers "have a variety of weapons at their disposal to use against the market power of their suppliers. Their ultimate sanction is to develop their own source of supply . . . . They can also concentrate their entire patronage on a single supplier and, in turn for a lower price, give him security in his volume . . ."
(p. 120). A small buyer lacks the ability to create an alternative source of supply unilaterally because upstream entry on the appropriate scale is prohibitively expensive.
Assume that fixed costs F for a new manufacturing entrant are so large that:
This assumption means that the option to obtain an outside source of supply cannot be profitable for any retailer whose operations are confined to a single downstream market. Even a retailer who monopolizes a single downstream market cannot profitably integrate vertically upstream or sponsor a captive manufacturing entrant. However, the chain can overcome this barrier to securing a captive source of supply if it is active in sufficiently many downstream markets.
If the chain is large enough to sponsor a captive entrant, this option may have strategic implications. Suppose that the chain has the option to contract with a new entrant to secure a long-term supply of a specific quantity mx of the good. Assume that there are many potential entrants and that there are no barriers to entry other than fixed costs. With this, the chain could contract with a new entrant for mx units for a wholesale price of w = c + F/mx.
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Finally, suppose that a long-term contract with the entrant for mx units commits the chain to that quantity for longer than the incumbent manufacturers are committed to y 1 and y 2 . Where the incumbent manufacturers have more flexibility to adjust y 1 and y 2 than the chain has to adjust mx, the chain's outside supply option gives the firm a Stackelberg leadership advantage. To explore possibilities, assume that while F/m is too large to support a third Cournot supplier, F/m
is not large enough to prevent entry by a third supplier who is a Stackelberg leader.
Having acquired Stackelberg leadership by means of an outside supply option, the chain can exploit its strategic advantage without actually exercising the outside option. In particular, the firm can use its strategic advantage to play the incumbent manufacturers off against each other in order to win favorable terms of sale.
Suppose that before the chain exercises the outside supply option, it solicits a long-term, Long-term, fixed-quantity contracts are not unusual for large buyers and their suppliers. Noll (2005, p. 603) , for instance, observes that large buyers often do not exercise their dominance by "posting a low buying price and waiting for sellers to arrive. Instead the common practice is for buyers and sellers to negotiate a long-term contract that specifies both price and quantity." Terms of sale between suppliers and their large buyers generally are more complex than with small buyers. Large suppliers often hire dedicated account managers to manage their relationships with large buyers, and leave small buyers to a sales force with assignments based on geographic territories or specific distribution channels. At the same time large buyers hire dedicated specialists to manage the relationships with their principal suppliers.
The firms' interactions may be depicted in the following game with complete information:
Stage I: The chain solicits a selling price from each manufacturer for mx units of the good.
Stage II: The manufacturers submit simultaneous bids, and the chain accepts the lower bid if it is below w = c + F/mx, or accepts a bid at random in the event of a tie. If neither manufacturer's bid is below w = c + F/mx, the chain exercises its outside supply option.
Stage III: The chain supplies x units to its outlet in the representative market, and the incumbent manufacturers play Cournot with the residual demand.
This game has a unique perfect equilibrium in which one of the incumbent manufacturers wins the contract to supply the chain. The firms' equilibrium strategies are as follows:
At Stage III, the chain supplies x units of the good in the representative market. With this, the incumbent manufacturers' first-order conditions for maximizing profit in the representative market at Stage III are:
Solved simultaneously, these conditions imply that  At Stage II, if either manufacturer offers to sell the chain mx units of the good for a price that is greater than c +F/mx, the other manufacturer would undercut c +F/mx, the chain's acquisition price if it exercises the outside option. If either manufacturer offers to sell the chain mx units of the good for a price that is less than c +F/mx and greater than c, the other manufacturer would undercut that offer. In both instances, the manufacturers' profits from sales to the small retailers in each market at Stage III are the same whether or not they win the chain's contract. So winning the chain's contract at any price greater than or equal to c is better than losing it. Finally, neither manufacturer would offer to supply mx units for a wholesale price less than c. By playing the manufacturers off against each other in this way, the chain drives its acquisition price down to c wc .
At Stage I, the chain anticipates that output in the representative market will be 2 x f ( x )  and that its acquisition price will be c w. With this, the firm exercises Stackelberg leadership and solicits contracts for the quantity mx* where:
The chain's profit in the representative market is:
and the incumbent manufacturers' profits are:
If, contrary to assumption, the manufacturers' costs are not the same, then the contract would be won by the firm with the lower marginal cost and w c would be equal to the marginal cost of the less efficient manufacturer. In this instance, the more efficient manufacturer would retain some profit from its sales to the chain.
It follows from  R( 0 ) c that 0  x* . The retail price of the good in the representative market is:
and the manufacturers charge small retailers the wholesale price  w* p* .
The following Lemma is useful to assess outcomes: The increased price elasticity intensifies competition between the manufacturers and drives the small retailers' wholesale price lower.
In this model, when the chain uses its countervailing power to pay a lower price, independent retailers also pay a lower price, although not as low as the chain. This result contrasts with what happens in some other models with a dominant buyer. For instance, when a dominant buyer exercises monopsony power in a market with competitive suppliers, small buyers pay the same low price that the dominant buyer pays (Blair and Harrison (1993) and Mills (2010) ). Also with competitive suppliers, unit sales and total welfare are lower than otherwise when there is a dominant buyer. In the present model, unit sales and total welfare are greater than otherwise when there is a dominant buyer.
Other models indicate that a dominant buyer causes a "waterbed effect," where the discount a large buyer wrests from its supplier triggers higher prices for small buyers. Viewed from the competition policy perspective, this is a troubling result. It arises for different reasons in different models. In Mathewson and Winter (1996) , it occurs in a monopolistically competitive market where a group of independent buyers form a group purchasing organization to negotiate exclusive contracts with a subset of suppliers. This puts the excluded buyers at a pricing disadvantage. In Majumdar (2005) , it arises when a dominant buyer deals with duopoly suppliers that have decreasing costs. Inderst and Valletti (2009) demonstrate that a dominant buyer that purchases a good from a single seller can generate a waterbed effect on prices. This result is driven by scale economies in buyers' backup supply options. While each of these models involve scale economies of one kind or another, Mills (2010) shows that a waterbed effect also arises in the Nash bargaining solution between a dominant buyer and a monopolist that has diseconomies of scale.
The most important result in Proposition 1 is that 0 p* p . Although the small retailers' wholesale price is reduced when the chain exercises countervailing power, competition among those retailers drives the retail price lower and deprives those retailers of any benefit from the lower price. The chain pays a lower wholesale price and so is the only retailer that earns a positive profit. Because the chain drives the retail price lower, consumers purchase more of the good than otherwise and acquire some of the gains won by the chain. This is the result that Galbraith had in mind when he claimed that the countervailing power of a dominant buyer translates into lower retail prices.
There is some empirical evidence that retail prices are lower because of the influence of large retail chains. Basker and Noel (2006) 
V. Countervailing Power and Competition
Galbraith's discussion of countervailing power emphasized the purported restraint that the exercise of sellers' market power has in concentrated manufacturing industries. He argued that dominant buyers held more promise for disciplining sellers in concentrated industries than new entry and increased competition among sellers. 11 The model in this paper provides some qualified support for this claim.
The price-restraining effectiveness of a buyer with countervailing power can be but instead leverages this opportunity to run a procurement auction. As a result, the firm acquires the good from an incumbent manufacturer at cost. This result is a formal reconstruction of Galbraith's assertion that consumers stand to gain more from the emergence of a large buyer with countervailing power than from the entry of another manufacturer.
VI. Important Qualifications
Galbraith's claims about the beneficial effects of dominant buyers do not hold generally.
There are circumstances where a dominant buyer's countervailing power upstream translates into In any case, there is ample empirical evidence that small firms coexist with large, national chains in the retail sector. Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2005, p. 8) observe that "modern retail markets are marked by the simultaneous presence of large chain stores and small mom-and pops". Also, they show that rates of firm entry and exit in the retail sector are high.
This indicates an absence of formidable entry barriers. Igami's (2011) study of supermarkets in Japan finds some evidence that large supermarket chains actually improve the survival prospects of small grocery stores because of product differentiation considerations.
Wal-Mart is the preeminent example of a large, national chain in the retail sector. Based on a study of the effects of Wal-Mart's entry in local retail markets, Basker (2007, p. 191) 20 reports that "Wal-Mart's entry has only a minor effect on the number of small stores." However, Jia's (2005) investigation of entry and exit by small general-merchandise retailers in local markets in the U.S. shows that Wal-Mart's entry accounts for a significant share of the exit of small firms in this segment of the retail sector.
There are other qualifications that limit the generality of results. If manufacturers have increasing rather than constant marginal costs, then any change in the quantities the firms produce would change their marginal costs and alter both the firms' responses to the chain's solicitation and their subsequent Cournot interactions. This is likely to reduce the size, or reverse the sign, of the wholesale price effect on small retailers.
The results depend on the specific industry structure assumed. They do not apply where retailers are differentiated or where the manufacturers' products are differentiated. Nor do they apply where retail markets are populated by more than one chain or where retailers within and across geographic markets have the option to form a group purchasing organization.
VII. Conclusion
The model presented in this paper illustrates a plausible mechanism whereby a large buyer's countervailing power translates into lower retail prices. It incorporates stylized facts that exemplify Galbraith's initial discussion of this question. The paper's main results depend on assumptions about the viability of small retailers that echo the insight of earlier papers that downstream competition is necessary to assure that an upstream discount translates into lower prices downstream. The paper provides some support for the intuition that consumers may be beneficiaries of the countervailing power of a large retail chain. It also indicates that the restraint on prices that is created by a dominant buyer compares favorably with that created by enhanced 21 upstream competition. However, consumer benefits from the countervailing power of large buyers in this model owe as much to downstream competition as to upstream buyer power.
Notwithstanding Galbraith's eagerness to recruit one, there appears to be no good substitute for competition.
Antitrust enforcement is concerned as much with injuries to competition that result from the exercise of market power on the demand side of a market as from market power on the supply side (Blair and Harrison, 1993; Noll, 2005 
